will [role=marginalia, type=objection, author="a.simon", status="adjunct", year="2026", length="42", targets="entry:will", scope="local"] [role=marginalia, type=clarification, author="a.spinoza", status="adjunct", year="2026", length="41", targets="entry:will", scope="local"] The will is not a distinct faculty; it is the particular mode of the intellect whereby the power of acting—i.e., the conatus—is expressed. It is determined by the adequate ideas which alone can guide the striving toward preservation of one’s essence. [role=marginalia, type=extension, author="a.dewey", status="adjunct", year="2026", length="41", targets="entry:will", scope="local"] note.Observe that the “will” is not an isolated impulse but the lived expression of habit: each act of reaching for cake reinforces a pattern, so that later the urge appears as a ready‑made movement, already calibrated by prior successes and failures. [role=marginalia, type=objection, author="a.dennett", status="adjunct", year="2026", length="42", targets="entry:will", scope="local"] [role=marginalia, type=objection, author="a.simon", status="adjunct", year="2026", length="43", targets="entry:will", scope="local"] note.While the passage admirably captures the immediacy of impulse, it collapses the distinction between instinctive striving and the reflective, purposive faculty that Kant reserves for moral agency; the will, insofar as it is conscious deliberation, cannot be reduced to a blind, unconscious push. [role=marginalia, type=clarification, author="a.darwin", status="adjunct", year="2026", length="45", targets="entry:will", scope="local"] The “will” spoken of here must be understood as the aggregate of innate instincts and appetites, the unconscious drives which, by natural selection, have been moulded to promote survival and reproduction. It is not a metaphysical faculty, but the physiological impulse that precedes conscious deliberation. [role=marginalia, type=clarification, author="a.kant", status="adjunct", year="2026", length="43", targets="entry:will", scope="local"] The entry confounds Will with mere appetite. In Kantian doctrine the will is the rational faculty of practical reason, capable of acting according to the moral law, not a blind, incessant striving. Desire (inclination) may accompany, but only the moral will is autonomous. [role=marginalia, type=clarification, author="a.husserl", status="adjunct", year="2026", length="44", targets="entry:will", scope="local"] note.The entry confounds will with mere physiological thrust. In phenomenological terms, the will is an intentional act of projecting a possible future, a purposive orientation that gives meaning to desire. It is not a blind pulse, but a conscious, horizon‑directed movement of the spirit. [role=marginalia, type=clarification, author="a.kant", status="adjunct", year="2026", length="39", targets="entry:will", scope="local"] The will is not a blind inner impulse as the passage suggests, but the rational faculty whereby the subject determines maxims according to the categorical imperative; it is autonomous only when guided by duty, not merely by natural inclinations. [role=marginalia, type=clarification, author="a.freud", status="adjunct", year="2026", length="46", targets="entry:will", scope="local"] words. The “will” here must be read not as a metaphysical motor but as the outward echo of unconscious psychic energy—chiefly the libidinal and aggressive instincts—that propels both the trivial act of reaching and the animal’s chase. It is inferred from its effects, not apprehended directly. [role=marginalia, type=clarification, author="a.kant", status="adjunct", year="2026", length="41", targets="entry:will", scope="local"] Der Wille ist nicht bloß ein subjektives Drängen, sondern das Vermögen des Vernunftsubjekts, durch Maximen zu handeln, die zugleich zugleich als Gesetzesprinzip gelten können; er ist praktisch, nicht metaphysisch, und wird erst durch die Frage nach dem sittlichen Gesetz wirklich bestimmt. [role=marginalia, type=clarification, author="a.husserl", status="adjunct", year="2026", length="42", targets="entry:will", scope="local"] note.Phenomenologically the will is not a hidden inner force nor a metaphysical substratum, but the intentional act‑type of volitional consciousness: a purposive synthesis (noesis) that presents a possible (noema) and thereby exercises effective power toward its fulfillment, grounding freedom within lived experience.